

# THE CYPRUS QUESTION

A Brief Introduction





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*A Brief Introduction*

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“We are all prisoners of knowledge. To know how Cyprus was betrayed, and to have studied the record of that betrayal, is to make oneself unhappy and to spoil, perhaps for ever, one’s pleasure in visiting one of the world’s most enchanting islands. Nothing will ever restore the looted treasures, the bereaved families, the plundered villages and the groves and hillsides scalded with napalm. Nor will anything mitigate the record of the callous and crude politicians who regarded Cyprus as something on which to scribble their inane and conceited designs. But fatalism would be the worst betrayal of all. The acceptance, the legitimization of what was done—those things must be repudiated. Such a refusal has a value beyond Cyprus, in showing that acquiescence in injustice is not ‘realism’. Once the injustice has been set down and described, and called by its right name, acquiescence in it becomes impossible. That is why one writes about Cyprus in sorrow but more—much more—in anger.”

**Christopher Hitchens, *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger* (London and New York: Verso, 1997).**

“... if the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the state and if it is to foster rather than to militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction.”

**Dr Galo Plaza, *Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General*, UN Security Council S/6253, 26 March 1965.**

“By now it is no longer possible for violence and injustice to stifle a whole people in secret, without protest. Apparently, this world we thought had gone rotten, still has spirits that dare to rear their head against hypocrisy, injustice, arrogance.

It is a critical moment. The moral salvation of the whole world depends on the answer given to the Cyprus question. And on this moral salvation the political, social, cultural salvation of the world has always depended.

Cyprus is no longer a detail now, a mere island at the extreme tip of the Mediterranean. It is becoming the fate-marked center, where the moral value of contemporary man is at stake. [...]

There is some mystic law in this world (for if there were not, this world would have been destroyed thousands of years ago), a harsh inviolable law: in the beginning, evil always triumphs, and in the end it is always vanquished. [...]

For us this is a good moment to forget our passions and our petty cares; for each man of us with his own God-given gifts to follow the path of freedom throughout the land of Cyprus. And we must share her grief, her upsurge, her danger, insofar as we are capable, and surely later on (for this is the law, we said) her great joy as well.”

**Nikos Kazantzakis, “*The Angels of Cyprus,*” as it appeared as an Epilogue in his book *England: A Travel Journal* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1965)**

“The political-demographic de facto partition imposed on Cyprus since 1974 thus threatens not only the unity and integrity of a modern nation-state but also the millennial cultural integrity and continuity of the island which has been the crossroads of the civilization of the eastern Mediterranean.”

**Michael Jansen, “*Cyprus: The Loss of a Cultural Heritage,*” (*Modern Greek Studies Yearbook*, 2 (1986):314-323.**





***Excerpts from the Statement by the President of the  
Republic of Cyprus Mr Demetris Christofias, at the 66th  
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations,  
in New York, on 22 September 2011***

...

The Republic of Cyprus has experienced violence and we still suffer from its consequences. It still suffers from the consequences of the illegal Turkish invasion of 1974 and the ongoing occupation. Thirty-seven years later, the Republic of Cyprus, a full member of the UN and the European Union, still suffers from the occupation of a large part of its territory by the military forces of Turkey.

Turkey brutally violates the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. It violates the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriot citizens. This reality is also reflected in a number of United Nations Security Council Resolutions that unfortunately remain unimplemented due Turkish intransigence.

This is exactly the essence of the Cyprus problem. It is first and foremost a problem of invasion and occupation, a problem of violation of international law and the human rights of Cypriot citizens.

Since the Turkish invasion in 1974 our aim is a peaceful solution to the problem through dialogue and negotiations between the island's two communities. Upon our initiative, we have undertaken since September 2008, a new effort to solve the Cyprus problem, under the auspices of the UN, through direct negotiations. In 1977, by the first High Level Agreement between the leaders of the two communities, under the UN Secretary-General's auspices, it was determined that the sought- after solution is a bizonal, bicomunal federation; That is, the evolution of the unitary state into a federal one, with two federated units with political equality as defined in the UN Security Council Resolutions. One state, with a single sovereignty, a single citizenship and a single international personality. This basis was reaffirmed by the leaders of the two communities in 2008, when they agreed on the resumption of negotiations.

We aim to achieve a mutually-agreed solution, terminating the occupation and the illegal colonisation of settlers by Turkey in the occupied part of Cyprus. We seek a solution that reunifies the country and its people and creates conditions of lasting peace and security on the island.

During these three years of direct negotiations between the leaders of the two communities convergences have been reached on various aspects of the Cyprus problem. We work hard, and lately intensively, in order to reach more convergences

on the core issues. It is with regret that I note that – lately in particular – the Turkish Cypriot side is retracting on the negotiating table, including from previously found convergences. This change in the Turkish Cypriot leadership's stance feeds on recent negative and provocative policy of Turkey in the region.

An important aspect of the Cyprus problem, of humanitarian nature, is the issue of missing persons. This issue must be settled regardless of the developments in the negotiations. Turkey must fulfil its obligations stemming from the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, to allow exhumations in military areas and open the archives of its army and of other services, in order to determine the fate of the missing persons.

In recent years, the Republic of Cyprus has initiated a process for the exploration and potential extraction of hydrocarbons within its Exclusive Economic Zone. This was preceded by Agreements to delimit the Exclusive Economic Zone with neighbouring countries, always within the framework of international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which the Republic of Cyprus has ratified. We anticipate that this effort will contribute to the discovery of new energy resources, particularly for Europe, and of course for the shared benefit of our people, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike.

We believe that the possible discovery and extraction of hydrocarbons shall constitute yet another strong motive for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to expedite a just, functional and viable solution to the Cyprus problem, so that both communities can enjoy the natural wealth of our country in conditions of peace, security and prosperity.

Unfortunately, the effort of the Republic of Cyprus to exercise its sovereign right for exploitation of its marine wealth is met by threats of Turkey against Cyprus. Turkish naval maneuvers in the region of Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone, where exploration is being carried out, are provocative and a real danger for further complications in the region.

At the same time, Turkey continues its illegal actions by concluding an "agreement" with the illegal regime in the occupied area of the Republic of Cyprus, to pursue exploration within the Republic of Cyprus' Exclusive Economic Zone. I wish, from this esteemed podium, to condemn this illegal act which constitutes a provocation, not only for the Republic of Cyprus but also for the entire international community.

Instead of adopting a constructive stance in the negotiations towards a prompt solution to the Cyprus problem, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership are trying to create tension and new illegal faits-accomplis. Ankara's latest threats, directed against an EU member state, come at a time when Turkey seeks the opening of new chapters in its EU accession negotiations.

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We wish to express our gratitude to those permanent and non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as to the European Union, for their clear position, defending the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus. We call on the Security Council, the Secretariat and the United Nations in general, to impress upon the Turkish leadership that any threat to or violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, or any continuing violation of international and European law, will not be tolerated.

We are fully committed to continue working towards a solution of the Cyprus problem, within the agreed framework and on the basis of the agreed process, as soon as possible.

Considering that it is the Cypriot people who first and foremost are suffering from the continuing occupation, it is only natural for us to demonstrate goodwill and to exert every effort towards a just, viable and functional solution to the Cyprus problem and the reunification of the state and our people. We will continue to work for strengthening the cooperation and trust between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Rapprochement of the two communities is integral to our policy.

We continue our initiatives to create conditions conducive to a solution. We recall our proposal for the restitution of Famagusta – a European city uninhabited as a result of the Turkish occupation since 1974 – to its lawful inhabitants, under UN administration. Our proposal also includes the use of the city's port from the Turkish Cypriots under EU supervision. Implementation of this proposal will significantly boost the negotiations and increase trust between the two communities. This will also lead to the unfreezing of negotiating chapters in Turkey's EU accession process. We recall that the handing over of the uninhabited area of the city of Famagusta to UN administration and the return of its lawful inhabitants is demanded by Security Council Resolution 550 of 1984, which Turkey refuses to implement.

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It is to the credit of the UN Secretary-General that during his recent meetings with the leaders of the two communities he persistently sought reaffirmation of the basis of the negotiations from both sides. The Secretary-General made specific reference to UN Security Council resolution 1251.

We are also grateful that the Secretary-General has asked for the reaffirmation of the convergences that have been agreed hitherto in the framework of the talks. Negotiations must be carried out on a clear basis and without backtracking.



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## FOREWORD

In July 1974 Turkey invaded the Republic of Cyprus. This was in violation of the UN Charter and of fundamental principles of international law. The consequences of the military invasion and subsequent occupation of nearly forty percent of the sovereign territory of the Republic are still felt today. For more than three decades, Turkey's aggression has continued unabated. With it came military occupation, forcible division, population displacement, ethnic segregation, massive violation of human rights, colonization, attempted secession, cultural destruction, and property usurpation. These conditions, imposed by Turkey, constitute an unacceptable situation that has persisted on the island since 1974.

In his inaugural address on 28 February 2008, President Demetris Christofias emphasized that: "The problem has not been solved due to Turkey's refusal to accept a solution that would be to the benefit of the people of Cyprus." President Christofias went on to declare that "the time has come for a just, viable, and functional solution to the problem and for the restoration of the principles of international law, principles that Turkey has been violating through the invasion it carried out in 1974 and through the occupation of a large part of our homeland."

Today, Turkey, an aspiring member of the European Union, still stands guilty of international aggression against Cyprus, a member-state of the Union. The status quo of foreign military occupation and forcible division of an independent, sovereign state must be redressed by the international community.

This informational booklet, updated for the present edition, is intended to introduce the reader to basic aspects of a major international issue, the Cyprus Question or Cyprus Problem, as it is commonly referred to, and to the prospects for a viable settlement in line with European norms and the rule of law. It is a brief guide to a protracted and seemingly intractable conflict that provides background information to help place the current situation and new developments in proper historical perspective.

The more recent phase of the Cyprus problem, as it has developed since 1974, is dealt with in the first section, "Political Overview," while the "Historical Background" to the issue is covered in the subsequent section of the booklet.

The appendices and the chronology of key events that follow provide useful information relevant to the main text. The short, select bibliography,

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indicative of the vast literature on the Cyprus problem, can provide the interested reader with both a better understanding of and further guidance to an international issue that has engaged the international community for decades.

It is important to keep in mind that throughout the text, the terms “Turkish Cypriots” and “Turkish Cypriot community,” refer specifically and exclusively to the legal, indigenous, native Cypriot citizens of the Republic of Cyprus that are of Turkish ethnic background. These terms do not refer to and definitely exclude the tens of thousands of illegal settlers imported from Turkey into occupied Cyprus after 1974. The influx of these settlers, who have entered and remain illegally on the island, has been part of Ankara’s systematic effort to change the demographic structure of the Republic of Cyprus.

More information on the various dimensions of the Cyprus problem can be found on the website [www.moi.gov.cy/pio](http://www.moi.gov.cy/pio) and in numerous publications of the Press and Information Office (PIO). The PIO website is a convenient, comprehensive venue to current developments, background information, and useful links to other relevant sources. The reader is urged to explore this valuable resource for a more thorough understanding of the issues discussed in this booklet.

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## INTRODUCTION

Cyprus became an independent sovereign state in August 1960. Unfortunately, since the invasion and continuing military occupation by Turkey in 1974, the island republic remains forcibly divided. The dire consequences of this invasion, occupation and forcible division have been systematic violations of human rights, massive colonization of areas under occupation, property usurpation, the destruction of cultural heritage and ethnic separation.

The Cyprus question remains unresolved, an affront to the international legal order, and a threat to regional stability. Turkey's actions have been condemned by unanimous UN Security Council resolutions, UN General Assembly resolutions,<sup>\*</sup> international court decisions, and decisions by other major international and regional organizations. Regrettably, most of these resolutions and decisions remain unimplemented. As a result, the Republic of Cyprus is the only country in Europe since the end of the Cold War that remains forcibly divided because of foreign military occupation.

On 1 May 2004, the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union without achieving the desired goal of accession as a unified country. The government and people of Cyprus, however, remain committed to a viable settlement that would allow the genuine, peaceful, and secure reunification of their country, in conformity with European norms. Only then will all Cypriots be able to benefit fully from EU membership.

On 24 April 2004, the Greek Cypriot community overwhelmingly rejected a proposal submitted by the UN Secretary-General for the settlement of the Cyprus problem because it did not provide for a genuine reunification of Cyprus, its society, economy, and institutions. However, the government and the Greek Cypriot community remain firmly committed to the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and for a sustained peace process that will facilitate a viable, comprehensive settlement by the two communities themselves.

President Christofias reiterated that commitment in his inaugural address and outlined the parameters of the solution he envisions when he stated that:

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<sup>\*</sup> See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, *United Nations Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on Cyprus 1960-2006* (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 2006).

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The solution of the Cyprus problem will be the top priority of my government. The aim of our Presidency is to achieve a just, viable and functional solution that will terminate the occupation and colonization of our country; a solution that will restore the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and unity of the Republic of Cyprus, and will exclude any rights for military intervention in the internal affairs of our country by foreign powers; a solution that will reunite the territory, the people, the institutions, and the economy of our country in the framework of a bizonal, bicomunal federation.

The federal, bizonal, bicomunal Republic of Cyprus must have one single sovereignty and international personality and one single citizenship. The solution must be based on the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus and be compatible with international and the EU law, as well as with international conventions on human rights.

We demand that the solution restore and safeguard the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the people of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians, and Latins, including the right of return and the right to property for the refugees.

We demand that the solution provide for the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation troops and the demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus. The ultimate goal remains the demilitarization of all of Cyprus.

We support consistently the political equality of the two communities in the framework of a federation, as this is defined in the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.

The president steadfastly clarified on many occasions that the settlement sought would provide for the transformation of the unitary Republic of Cyprus into a federal republic. On 19 June 2008, he stated:

I categorically reject certain ideas promoted by Turkey and others for a so-called “virgin birth” or of a “new partnership state.” Cyprus’ EU membership is an added reason, while there are many more, as to why it cannot be a virgin birth or a new partnership between two states. What is actually realistically feasible to expect is the continuation of the Republic of Cyprus, which will evolve into a federal state within the agreed framework of a bizonal, bicomunal federation.



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After taking a series of initiatives following his election, President Christofias held several meetings with the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr Mehmet Ali Talat, between March and July 2008. During these meetings, the basis of a settlement was clarified. At their fourth meeting on 25 July 2008, it was decided that full-fledged direct negotiations between the two, under the auspices of the United Nations, would start on 3 September in an effort to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The formal negotiations were launched in Nicosia with a meeting between President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Talat, in the presence of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Cyprus, Mr Alexander Downer, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr Tayé-Brook Zerihoun. In his message on the launch of the talks, the Secretary-General stated that: “The United Nations supports and encourages both parties as they take this historic step together, so as to reach a negotiated settlement to reunify the island for the benefit of all the people of Cyprus.” He also pledged that the UN will provide “unwavering support” to the process.

President Christofias had previously explained that:

The principal players in this ongoing process are the leaders of the two communities. The process is being carried out in the framework of the United Nations, with the UN Secretary-General and his collaborators playing an assisting role. Bearing in mind the traumatic experiences we went through in 2004—with the process of tight deadlines and arbitration—we have made it clear to the international community that the leaders of the two communities will continue to be the primary interlocutors in the dialogue. In this way, we will all avoid repeating the mistakes of the recent past. We are pursuing a settlement by Cypriots for Cypriots, and this is understood by the international community as well.

The president reiterated this position in his first address to the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2008 where he pointed out that: “The Cypriots themselves must build the state they envision for their society. The role of the Secretary-General and of the international community is to assist and to support.” Any attempt to impose or import non-Cypriot inspired and improvised models for a settlement, he said, will be rejected by the people of Cyprus. The President has consistently maintained these positions.

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## POLITICAL OVERVIEW

### *Seeking a Negotiated Solution*

Following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the Turkish side demanded a solution that would keep the two communities apart, either as two separate sovereign states or two separate states under a loose confederation.

The two communities agreed in 1977 and 1979 to reunite Cyprus under a bicomunal, federal republic, the parameters of which had evolved through the years. For the Greek Cypriots, who had strongly advocated the concept of a unitary state, the acceptance of a bizonal, bicomunal federation was the ultimate concession and historic compromise in their effort to terminate Turkey's military occupation and achieve the reunification of Cyprus.

As President Christofias emphasized in his opening statement at the beginning of the formal negotiations on 3 September 2008,

a solution based on a bizonal, bicomunal federation was a major concession made by President Makarios in 1977, and due credit should be given to this concession. I wish to be clear from the beginning of the present negotiations: with this concession, the Greek Cypriot side has exhausted its limits and cannot go any further. Neither confederation, nor any new partnership of two states through "virgin birth" can be accepted. The federal solution will be a partnership of the two communities.

The UN-led peace process has since 1977 sought to define the framework of such a federal solution. Negotiations have sought to reconcile the interests and concerns of the two sides under a common central government. Issues of definitions of objectives and ways to implement a comprehensive federal settlement became serious problems mainly because of the intransigence of Turkey, the occupying power, which holds the key to a final settlement and should be pressured to adopt a constructive attitude toward the peace effort.

UN Security Council resolution 367 of 12 March 1975 reactivated the Secretary-General's mission of good offices, which had been interrupted in 1974. Since then, intermittent negotiations under UN auspices have taken place. There have been high level meetings between successive presidents of the Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot leaders,

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proximity talks, proposals for confidence building measures, and various plans by UN and other foreign emissaries. All these actions have failed to resolve the Cyprus problem for a number of reasons, including:

- Failure to implement UN Security Council resolutions
- Prevalence of third-party strategic, economic, and political considerations over a viable and functional solution that satisfies the concerns of the state of Cyprus and of all Cypriots
- Intransigent policies of successive governments in Turkey who claimed that the Cyprus problem was “solved” in 1974
- Political conditions in the Turkish Cypriot community and insistence by Turkish leaders on the recognition of the so-called “TRNC”
- All major concessions in the peace process coming from the Greek Cypriot side
- Disregard of international law, European law, and precedent-setting decisions by regional and national courts in proposed “solutions” to the Cyprus problem.

Lack of progress in the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General led the leaders of the G-8 on 20 June 1999 to call on the parties to engage in talks on all issues without preconditions and commit to negotiate until a settlement is reached based on full consideration of relevant UN resolutions and treaties. This formula was also endorsed by UN Security Council resolution 1250 of 29 June, 1999. The process, having gone through various stages, culminated in the UN proposal known as the “Annan Plan,” which was submitted to the parties first in November 2002 and subsequently, in its final form (“Annan V”), in March 2004.

### ***Issues under Discussion since 1974***

The Cyprus problem has since 1974 been one of military invasion and continuing occupation in violation of relevant unanimous UN Security Council resolutions. Negotiations, especially after 16 January 2002, aimed at a comprehensive solution for the reunification of Cyprus. Throughout this process, the government of Cyprus sought a solution reflecting democratic norms, the UN Security Council resolutions, international law, European Union law, and relevant court decisions. Specific issues under discussion have included:

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- Implementation of UN Security Council resolutions and the high level agreements that call for a bizonal, bicomunal federation
  - New power sharing formula under a federal government with adequate powers for effective governance, for safeguarding the unity of the Republic, and for meeting its international and EU obligations
  - Continuation of one Republic with one single sovereignty and international personality and one single citizenship
  - Safeguards for the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic and the exclusion in whole or in part of union with any other country or any form of partition or secession
  - Political equality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as defined in relevant Security Council resolutions
  - Guarantees against foreign interference and unilateral right of intervention by another country
  - Withdrawal of foreign forces under relevant UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions
  - Return of displaced persons and a property recovery system in conformity with the European Convention and court decisions
  - Right to acquire property and reside anywhere in Cyprus without restrictive quotas based on ethnic or religious criteria
  - Full respect for the human rights of all Cypriots under the European Convention
  - Repatriation of the illegal settlers to Turkey, except for a limited number based on special humanitarian considerations
  - Compatibility of any settlement with the obligations and rights of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU
  - Complete demilitarization of the Cypriot state.

### ***UN Negotiations, 2002–2004***

This period marks the more sustained effort under the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. All earlier efforts, especially those of 1999–2000, foundered over the Turkish demand for recognition of the illegal “state” in the areas of the Republic occupied by Turkey.

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The direct talks between President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash which started on 16 January 2002 failed to make substantive progress. In an attempt to secure an agreement by the 12-13 December 2002 Copenhagen EU summit, which would decide on the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented on 11 November 2002 a detailed plan for a comprehensive settlement (Annan I). Following reaction by the parties, the plan was revised on 10 December 2002 (Annan II) and again on 26 February 2003 (Annan III).

The Secretary-General met with the leaders of the two communities at the Hague on 10 and 11 March 2003 to ascertain whether they were prepared to submit his latest proposal (Annan III) to separate and simultaneous referenda. The newly elected president of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, agreed, provided the Cypriot public was offered a complete legal and political settlement framework for their consideration; Greece and Turkey had reached an agreement on vital security issues; and there was adequate time for discussion and a public campaign prior to the referendum. The Turkish side rejected the proposal of the Secretary-General.

In January-February 2003, massive Turkish Cypriot demonstrations took place in the occupied areas against Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and his Ankara supported policies. The Republic of Cyprus, as expected, signed the EU Treaty of Accession on 16 April 2003.

On 23 April 2003, under growing public Turkish Cypriot discontent with the situation in occupied Cyprus, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership were compelled to partially lift restrictions, which they had imposed since 1974 along the UN ceasefire line, on the movement of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Since then, thousands of Cypriots have been crossing regularly the ceasefire line. In addition, thousands of Turkish Cypriots cross daily to work in the free areas, to claim passports and other documents issued by the government of Cyprus and to receive free medical care. These peaceful crossings have destroyed the myth cultivated for years by Turkish propaganda that the two communities cannot live together. But these measures are no substitute for a comprehensive settlement.

The U.S. government was eager to capitalize on the readiness of the Greek Cypriot side to participate in new negotiations. On the consensus that emerged in meetings with Turkey's premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan in

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Washington, in January 2004, the U.S. administration persuaded Secretary-General Kofi Annan to call for a resumption of negotiations in New York.

On 13 February 2004, it was agreed by the parties that negotiations would commence in Nicosia for changes that fell within the parameters of Annan III. In case of continuing deadlock, even after the involvement of Greece and Turkey in the process, the Secretary-General would finalize a text which would then be submitted to the two communities on Cyprus for a vote in separate and simultaneous referenda.

This was a significant change in the UN Secretary-General's mission of good offices as had been conceived since 1964. Without Security Council authorization, the Secretary-General assumed the power of arbitrator as a precondition for the new round of talks. In accepting this formula, the Greek Cypriots assumed that the Secretariat would maintain its objectivity and commitment to fundamental UN principles. They were proven wrong. By the time of the talks in Switzerland late in March 2004, the Secretariat became a partial party to the dispute by promoting most of Turkey's positions on the Cyprus problem.

The change in the Secretary-General's role, coupled with extremely tight negotiating deadlines and Turkey's intransigence, contributed to the absence of serious negotiations both in Nicosia and subsequently in Bürgenstock, Switzerland. In order to gain Turkey's consent, nearly all of its demands were incorporated arbitrarily in the two plans (Annan IV and V), presented by the Secretary-General. Annan V was presented to the two sides on 31 March 2004. Turkey, the United States and the United Nations agreed to accept the EU presence only on an observer status in the talks, while the EU made the commitment to accommodate the derogations from European law that were included in Annan V. The Secretary-General's plan was a comprehensive document of nearly 10.000 pages. This complex, legal document was not available in its totality on the UN website until hours before the referendum. Cypriots were called to vote on the document on 24 April 2004, only days before the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU on 1 May.

## ***The 24 April 2004 Referenda—the People’s Decision\****

Following a spirited public debate, the Greek Cypriot voters overwhelmingly rejected Annan V, by a vote of 75,8 percent against 24,2 percent. In contrast, 64,9 percent of the Turkish Cypriot voters approved the plan. It should be noted that settlers from Turkey, who had no legal right to vote, were allowed to do so.

The Greek Cypriot “no” vote was not a vote against reunification or reconciliation. It was a rejection of a process that led to a one-sided plan perceived harmful to the legitimate rights of the Greek Cypriot community and to the survival of the state of Cyprus itself. It was a rejection of a flawed plan that did not provide for the genuine reunification of Cyprus, its institutions, people, and economy. This negative vote came from Greek Cypriots of all ages, political parties, and gender.

The positive Turkish Cypriot vote is easy to explain:

- Rejection of the authoritarian policies of Rauf Denktaş
- Continuation of the illegal Turkish Cypriot “state”
- Legitimization of the status of nearly all illegal settlers from Turkey in the Turkish Cypriot component state
- Permanent presence of troops from Turkey on Cyprus
- Right of Turkey to intervene in Cyprus

Finally, the Turkish Cypriot vote was motivated by the anticipation of substantial economic benefits emanating from the accession of Cyprus to the EU and of expected economic support from the Greek Cypriot community.

Various legitimate reasons explain the Greek Cypriot negative vote, including:

- Rigid negotiating deadlines, no real time for discussion of a most complex legal document, and threats expressed or implied by some of the interlocutors if the Greek Cypriots did not accept the UN plan
- Major derogations from the European Convention of Human Rights depriving all Cypriots of fundamental rights, while other EU nationals residing in Cyprus would enjoy all such rights under the Convention

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\* See Claire Palley, *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999–2004* (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005).

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- Dissolution of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus and replacement by a loose confederation of two largely autonomous states
  - Questionable functionality of the new state in view of the provisions on the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches, and the presence of enhanced minority vetoes. (Non-Cypriot third parties, unaccountable to the Cypriot public, would cast deciding votes in key policy areas)
  - Confederal nature of the proposed constitution was reflected in the absence of a provision on the hierarchy of laws. (This carried the risk of jurisdictional conflicts, which would accentuate the divisive nature of the proposed new polity)
  - Absence of adequate guarantees to ensure that the commitments undertaken by the parties and particularly Turkey would be carried out
  - Economic cost of the proposed settlement—convergence, reconstruction, property compensation, compensation to settlers, monetary policy—would be largely borne by the Greek Cypriots. (Turkey, whose military aggression divided the island, was absolved of any financial responsibility for its actions in Cyprus)
  - Security issues involving the gradual reduction and continued presence of Turkish troops with expanded intervention rights even after Turkey joins the EU. (The “United” Cyprus was excluded from the common European defense policy and would be totally demilitarized. Turkey’s proposed guarantees violated the obligation of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states and the respect of the territorial integrity of all states)
  - Issues of citizenship definition and the fact that nearly all settlers from Turkey would remain in Cyprus
  - Violations of property rights that are essential rights under the European Convention and overturning of important European Court precedents
  - Expansion of Britain’s rights in the sovereign base areas and in the Republic’s territorial waters
  - Deletion of the ratification by the Republic of Cyprus of the 1936 Montreux Treaty (Cyprus is a major maritime power. The plan also granted Turkey near veto rights on the continental shelf of Cyprus)
  - Violation of the European Convention by denying the right of Cypriots to acquire property and live wherever they chose, as other EU nationals could, without restrictive quotas based on ethnicity and religion.



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Ultimately, the plan was rejected because it was judged by the great majority of Cypriots not to be the best for the common interest of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. As President Papadopoulos stated at the time, “while all demands by Turkey were adopted in the final Plan on the last day, basic concerns of the Greek Cypriot side were disregarded. All involved in the talks were anxious to bring Turkey on board and ensure a ‘yes’ vote by the Turkish Cypriot community, and ignored the fact that the far bigger Greek Cypriot community also needed to be convinced to vote ‘yes’ on the Plan. Thus, this process failed to address the legitimate concerns, needs, and interests of both sides.”

The negative outcome of the referendum rendered the Annan Plan null and void.

### ***Alleged Turkish Cypriot Isolation\****

Following the rejection of the Annan Plan, Turkey launched a propaganda campaign under the slogans of “easing,” “lifting” or “ending” the alleged “isolation” of Turkish Cypriots, and bridging the “economic disparity” between the two communities on the island. Regrettably, this has led to widespread misinformation, regarding the situation in Cyprus, and to some questionable proposals, ostensibly to improve the economic conditions of Turkish Cypriots. Turkey has even tried to mislead the international community into believing that the government of Cyprus was, somehow, responsible for the predicament of the Turkish Cypriots.

Turkey used this approach for two reasons: to divert, in view of its EU aspirations, attention from its ongoing military aggression against Cyprus and to upgrade the illegal regime in the occupied areas of the island.

In essence, Ankara has been seeking to secure for the secessionist regime economic attributes of an independent entity with no formal international recognition. This would allow the illegal regime to exist without any incentive for constructive participation in the peace process for the reunification of the island. In their efforts to gain international support for their propaganda, Turkish leaders have adopted, as their main argument, the misleading slogan of “ending the economic isolation” of Turkish Cypriots when, in fact, their goal has been all along political.

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\* See Miltos Miltiadou, *Toward a Unified Cyprus: The Myth of Turkish Cypriot “Isolation,”* Fourth Edition (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 2010).

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However, any moves promoting the de facto recognition of the illegal secessionist regime would be in direct violation of international law and UN Security Council resolutions, especially resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). Such moves would also undermine efforts for the country's reunification, which is the declared position of the UN, the EU, the international community at large, as well as of the two Cypriot communities themselves.

The plight of the Turkish Cypriot community has been the direct result of Turkey's aggression, which keeps Cyprus, its people, institutions and economy divided. It is also the result of misguided policies by Turkish Cypriot leaders, who have consistently promoted Turkey's interests at the expense of their own community and of Cyprus as a whole. The so-called "isolation" of Turkish Cypriots is very much a self-inflicted wound. It is certainly not the result of any action taken by the government of Cyprus, which has sovereignty over all the territory of the state, including the occupied areas, and which abides by its obligation to defend its sovereign rights and the rule of law.

In response to Turkey's military aggression, the Republic of Cyprus introduced a number of defensive measures to safeguard its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and economy. One of these measures was the declaration of all seaports and airports in the Turkish occupied area of the Republic as illegal. Such measures became necessary, because the government was not able to exercise effective control in the areas of Cyprus under Turkish military control.

Under international law, the Republic of Cyprus is the only legal and recognized authority with sole responsibility for air and sea travel, trade, security, safety, and similar issues within its sovereign territory. Similarly, under international law, the regime established by Turkey in occupied Cyprus is illegal and, therefore, all its professed institutions, decisions, and documents have no political or legal validity. As European Courts and the UN Security Council have affirmed, the Turkish Cypriot regime has no legal status in the international community. The European Court of Human Rights has declared this illegal regime as Turkey's "subordinate local administration" in occupied Cyprus (See Appendix 2).

The record clearly shows that the military occupation by Turkey has victimized, albeit in different ways, both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island. Turkey's continuing occupation is directly responsible for whatever sense of "isolation" Turkish Cypriots may have

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experienced. In fact, Turkey prevents Turkish Cypriots from realizing their full potential and deprives them of substantial benefits and opportunities they are entitled to as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and the EU.

The government of Cyprus has always been concerned about the economic situation of Turkish Cypriots. It has been better able to provide services to Turkish Cypriots since the partial lifting in 2003 of illegal restrictions, imposed by the Turkish military on the free movement of people across the 1974 UN ceasefire line that extends across the island. Turkish Cypriots have since been able to work, in increasing numbers, in the government-controlled areas earning income estimated at more than 273 million euro so far and to enjoy an expanded range of benefits, including free medical care (See Appendix 1).

Only through the reunification of Cyprus can the reintegration of Turkish Cypriots into the international community and the improvement of their political and economic welfare be accomplished legally and comprehensively.

Separatist tendencies, under the false banner of “ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots” and other politically motivated schemes promoted by Turkey, do little to enhance the welfare of the Turkish Cypriot community or the peace process.

Instead, such ideas divert attention from Turkey’s continuing aggression against Cyprus and from Ankara’s failure to abide by its obligations to the EU, including the opening of its seaports and airports to ships and aircraft carrying the Cyprus flag. They also inhibit the political will of the Turkish side, thereby undermining initiatives to address the core issue at hand, namely, the solution to the division of Cyprus. Furthermore, they help to solidify the illegal situation created by Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus and to perpetuate the victimization of Turkish Cypriots. Finally, they impede the cause of reconciliation and lasting peace on the island and in the region.

### ***Reviving the Peace Process 2005–2006***

Even though the 2002–2004 UN effort did not resolve the Cyprus problem, the referendum was not the end of the road. In fact, the result of the referendum on the Annan Plan must act as a catalyst for reunification and not as a pretext for further division. The Greek Cypriots and the government of the Republic have demonstrated repeatedly that they

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remain committed to a solution that will provide a prosperous and secure future for all Cypriots and ensure respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms within the EU.

Many in the international community were unfamiliar with the detailed provisions of the failed Annan Plan and its implications on the future of the state of Cyprus and its citizens. It was, therefore, not surprising that they expressed disappointment with the outcome of the referendum. What was actually regrettable and disappointing was that the Plan presented to the people did not allow both communities to endorse it. Whereas other parties simply wanted any solution or a closing up of the Cyprus problem as quickly as possible, the Greek Cypriots have always insisted on achieving a comprehensive, functional, and viable settlement.

A solution that can withstand the test of time must be perceived as fair by the people who will have to live with it. Thus, no solution can succeed if it does not address the legitimate concerns that prevented the Greek Cypriots from approving the Annan plan in 2004. The fact that Cyprus is a small and weak state makes it even more imperative that all Cypriots enjoy the fundamental rights that all other EU nationals enjoy under European law and the European Convention, and that there is no discrimination based on ethnicity or religion.

In order to revive the peace process, President Tassos Papadopoulos exchanged views with the Secretary-General in New York on 16 September 2005 concerning the preparation of a renewed effort on Cyprus by the UN. The Secretary-General also met with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, on 31 October. In his report to the Security Council on 20 November 2005, the Secretary-General noted that both leaders and many countries urged him to consider holding new talks in the context of his good offices mission.

President Papadopoulos subsequently met with the Secretary-General in Paris, on 28 February 2006, where they reviewed the situation in Cyprus and examined modalities for moving forward on the process leading to the reunification of the island. They also agreed that the resumption of the negotiating process within the framework of the Secretary-General's good offices must be timely and based on careful preparation.

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## ***The 8 July 2006 Agreement***

This outcome generated a new momentum for the resumption of the peace process on Cyprus. On July 3, President Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Talat met on the sidelines of a meeting of the Committee on Missing Persons and in the presence of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative on Cyprus. In addition, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, visited Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus during 3-9 July. Following a joint meeting on 8 July with President Papadopoulos and Mr Talat, the UN Under-Secretary presented the following "Set of Principles" agreed to by the parties:

1. Commitment to the unification of Cyprus based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation and political equality, as set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions.
2. Recognition of the fact that the status quo is unacceptable and that its prolongation would have negative consequences for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.
3. Commitment to the proposition that a comprehensive settlement is both desirable and possible and should not be further delayed.
4. Agreement to begin a process immediately, involving bi-communal discussion of issues that affect the day to day life of the people and concurrently those that concern substantive issues, both of which will contribute to a comprehensive settlement.
5. Commitment to ensure that the 'right atmosphere' prevails for this process to be successful. In that connection, confidence building measures are essential, both in terms of improving the atmosphere and improving the life of all Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Also in that connection, an end must be put to the so-called 'blame game.'

In addition, the two leaders decided that Technical Committees on issues that affect day to day life would commence work provided that, at the same time, they would also have exchanged a list of issues of substance, the contents of which would be studied by expert bicomunal working groups and finalized by the leaders.

The 8 July Agreement reaffirmed the Cyprus government's commitment to reunify the island on the basis of a bizonal, bicomunal federation.

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On 29 August 2006, the UN Security Council urged the implementation of the 8 July Agreement without further delay and expressed its support for the continued efforts of the Secretary-General to achieve a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus.

In order to facilitate the process, on 15 November 2006 the UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs proposed suggestions for the implementation of the 8 July Agreement. Unfortunately, difficulties appeared during the preparatory phase, because the Turkish side questioned the fundamental elements of the Agreement. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General in April 2007, the Turkish Cypriot leader sought to alter the agreed framework of the 8 July Agreement.

In his address to the UN General Assembly on 26 September, President Papadopoulos reiterated the commitment of the government to the 8 July Agreement and to a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Noting that the status quo of foreign military occupation and forcible division of the island should not be sustained, the president called for “a meaningful and forward-looking process” to elicit concrete results and a comprehensive solution. He also discussed the need for the acceleration of the implementation of the UN process with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 23 September in New York.

For the government of Cyprus as well as for the United Nations, the 8 July Agreement procedure became the only way available leading to a mutually acceptable solution. However, its implementation was undermined by the prevarications of the Turkish side.

On 8 March 2007, the Cyprus government demolished the barricade structure on Ledra Street in the capital city of Nicosia, in order to facilitate the opening of the eight crossing points along the 1974 UN ceasefire line that the government had proposed for opening since 2005.

On 3 April 2008 the crossing point at Ledra Street was opened to assist the movement of people between the government controlled areas and the areas under occupation by the Turkish troops. Moreover, the Kato Pyrgos-Limnitis crossing point on the UN ceasefire line, linking the remote Pyrgos area in the north west of Cyprus to the capital Nicosia through the buffer zone, was officially opened on 14 October 2010.

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### *New Initiatives in 2008 Yield Results*

Despite the setback caused by the Turkish refusal to implement the 8 July Agreement, the newly elected president of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, sought, immediately after his inauguration on 28 February 2008, to meet with the Turkish Cypriot leader, in yet another effort to achieve a breakthrough and to set in motion a process that would bring about direct negotiations between the two communities. He also embarked on a world campaign to reenergize the international community toward a new peace process, in which the two communities would have the leading roles.

In his inaugural address, President Christofias pledged that a solution to the Cyprus problem would be the top priority of his administration, and that he would take intensive initiatives domestically and internationally toward that goal. He also said that: "The starting point to break the deadlock and create the preconditions for a comprehensive negotiation of the Cyprus problem is the implementation of the 8 July Agreement, which is embraced and supported by the five permanent members of the Security Council."

At their first meeting, on 21 March 2008, President Christofias and Mr Talat decided to proceed with the setting up of a number of Working Groups and Technical Committees, and their respective agendas. They also decided to meet in three months time to evaluate the work of the Working Groups and Technical Committees, with a view to starting full-fledged negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. Additionally, they agreed on the opening of the Ledra Street crossing.

Following a briefing by UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Lynn Pascoe, who had visited Cyprus at the beginning of the month, the UN Security Council issued a statement on 17 April 2008. The Council welcomed these developments and expressed hope that they would produce results and prepare the ground for commencement of full-fledged negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General's good offices mission. The statement reaffirmed the Security Council's commitment to the reunification of Cyprus based on a bicomunal, bizonal federation and political equality, as set out in relevant Council resolutions. It also welcomed the Secretary-General's readiness to assist the parties in Cyprus and his intention of appointing, after the completion of a preparatory period and based on progress, a special adviser to facilitate movement toward a comprehensive settlement.

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In the meantime six Working Groups and seven Technical Committees commenced work on 22 April with the aim of making the necessary progress that would allow the two leaders to proceed to full-fledged negotiations. With this in mind, President Christofias proposed a second meeting with the Turkish Cypriot leader that took place on 23 May 2008.

At the meeting, in the presence of the new UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Cyprus, Mr Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, the two leaders "reaffirmed their commitment to bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This partnership will have a Federal Government with a single international personality ..." They also agreed to a new meeting where progress and its compatibility with the predefined basis would be assessed. They agreed that their representatives would meet prior to that for an assessment of the work of the Technical Committees and decided to pursue the opening of more crossing points and to consider the adoption of confidence-building measures.

On 5 June 2008, President Christofias met in London with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, with whom he discussed the Cyprus problem. The two leaders signed a Memorandum of Understanding that included their mutual desire for a solution to the Cyprus problem, based on the High level Agreements and the UN Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, in the Memorandum the United Kingdom reiterates its commitment to its obligations as a Guarantor Power of the Republic of Cyprus, noting that "the UK will not support any moves toward the partition of the island or the recognition or up-grading of any separate political entity on the island."

UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe met separately in Cyprus with the leaders of the two communities on 17 June 2008. President Christofias, reiterated his commitment to work toward a solution to the Cyprus problem. He emphasized that "the aim must be to transform the Republic of Cyprus into a united, bizonal, bicomunal federal Republic of Cyprus with a single sovereignty, a single citizenship and a single international personality," adding that "These positions derive also from positions agreed upon with the Turkish Cypriot community." Mr Pascoe noted that "the two leaders are very committed to moving forward and finally resolving the Cyprus problem and to getting a unified Cyprus."



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On 20 June 2008, the representatives of the president of Cyprus and of the Turkish Cypriot leader announced a set of agreed measures with regard to cultural heritage, road safety, health, and the environment.

In the meantime, the UN Security Council welcomed the agreement of 21 March and the Joint Statement of 23 May 2008. These developments, the Council said, “have demonstrated a renewed political willingness to support and engage fully and in good faith with the UN’s efforts, reaffirmed the commitment of the leaders to a bicomunal, bizonal federation with political equality, as set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions, and to consider further civilian and military confidence building measures.”

President Chistofias and Mr Talat met again on 1 July 2008 and issued the following joint statement:

The two Leaders met today in a positive and cooperative atmosphere.

They undertook a first review of the work of the Working Groups and Technical Committees.

They discussed the issues of single sovereignty and citizenship [on] which they agreed in principle. They agreed to discuss the details of their implementation during the full-fledged negotiations.

They agreed to meet on 25 July when they will undertake the final review of the Working Groups and Technical Committees.

On 16 July 2008, President Christofias reiterated that “Our firm goal is to achieve a settlement of the Cyprus problem that would terminate the Turkish occupation and colonization and reunify our homeland.” He emphasized that “We pursue a settlement that would allow Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the real masters of our homeland, to co-exist in conditions of permanent peace, cooperation, and security.” The president also explained that the set up of Working Groups and Technical Committees and the commencement of their work, which was agreed with the Turkish Cypriots in order to pave the way to comprehensive negotiations, “basically constitutes the implementation of the 8 July 2006 Agreement.”

President Christofias discussed developments of the Cyprus problem with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in Paris, on 13 July 2008, during which the Secretary-General assured the Cypriot leader of the intent of the United Nations to seek a solution to the Cyprus problem through talks between the two communities. The president stated that they also

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confirmed that the Cypriots themselves would be in charge of the procedure and that the role of the United Nations would be to facilitate the right conditions for the talks. The president “stressed our readiness to work hard with patience and persistence, while defending the principles set out by the UN resolutions” for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of his intention to designate, as of 14 July 2008, former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer as his Special Adviser on Cyprus with the rank of Under-Secretary-General.

The initiatives undertaken by President Christofias began to yield positive results and to gain support from the international community, including the EU and the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Washington, for example, dispatched the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs to Cyprus “to demonstrate the support of the United States for the efforts of the two leaders,” as he said at the end of his visit on 7 July, adding that: “The United States wants to see a reunified island. We support a bizonal, bicomunal federation. One nation, one citizenship, an undivided country.”

### ***Full-Fledged Direct Negotiations***

On 25 July President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Talat reviewed the work of the Technical Committees and Working Groups. Based on the progress made as well as on the clarification of the basis of the solution achieved during their meetings, they decided to “start full-fledged negotiations on 3 September 2008, under the good offices mission of the United Nations Secretary-General.” A joint statement on the outcome of the meeting read as follows:

Today the Leaders undertook the final review of the work of the Working Groups and Technical Committees. They noted the results achieved and commended their members for all their efforts.

Having made their final review, the Leaders decided to start their full-fledged negotiations on 3 September 2008, under the good offices mission of the United Nations Secretary-General.

The aim of the full-fledged negotiations is to find a mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem which will safeguard the fundamental and legitimate rights and interests of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The agreed solution will be put to separate simultaneous referenda.

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Regarding the Technical Committees, the Leaders today approved sixteen more measures in the areas of environment, cultural heritage, crisis management, crime and criminal matters and gave instructions for their immediate and full implementation.

As a reflection of their heightened engagement, the Leaders have agreed to establish a secure hotline to facilitate direct contact between them.

The Leaders welcome the appointment of Mr Alexander Downer as the Secretary-General's Special Adviser for Cyprus and look forward to working with him and the UN team in the coming period.

They also instructed their Representatives to take up the issue of Limnitis/Yilirmak and other crossings.

The launching of full-fledged negotiations on the Cyprus issue by the two Cypriot communities was greeted warmly by the international community, including the UN, the permanent members of the Security Council, and the EU.

Mr Downer called the beginning of the talks “a historic day for Cyprus, a very important day for Cyprus,” adding that “a settlement will be an inspiration to a troubled world.” Noting that there will likely be difficulties and challenges in the talks ahead, Mr Downer pointed out that “At the same time, the Cyprus problem is not insurmountable and the negotiations which you begin today can, and must, have a successful outcome.” He pledged unwavering support by the United Nations while underlining to the two leaders that:

You own this process, and, as a result, your continuing leadership is the critical element to make it succeed. In that regard, bringing Cypriots to the conviction that reunification of the island will work for the greater happiness and prosperity of all Cypriots will, ultimately, be paramount.

Expressing the hope that the two Cypriot communities will put aside the conflicts of the past, President Christofias emphasized that: “The time has come to put an end to the longstanding Cyprus problem and to give the people of Cyprus a better future that they deserve.” He called on the Turkish Cypriot leader “to take joint action and to respond to the call of history; to realize the vision of a reunified homeland, belonging to its people, the people of Cyprus, able and wanting to decide their own destiny, without third parties and so-called guardians of our communities.” He also reiterated that the “foundations of an agreement are described in

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the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979, which provide for the transformation of the unitary state into a federal one.” He then pointed out that the two sides should safeguard the basic principles that have guided the process so far and consistently adhere to the agreed common basis for a solution that was reaffirmed during the meeting between the two leaders, namely, “a bizonal, bicomunal federation with political equality, as defined by the relevant Security Council resolutions, with a single sovereignty, citizenship, and international personality.” Given that Cyprus is a full member of the European Union, the president said that “the solution must respect and implement the principles on which the European Union is founded.”

Serious concerns were raised at the time because of comments made by the Turkish Cypriot leader at the start of the talks which reiterated intransigent Turkish positions, such as insistence on maintaining guarantees and intervention rights by Turkey on Cyprus. In addition, instead of considering the federal solution a “partnership of the two communities,” reference was made to a “new partnership” of two states, a formulation that suggests a “confederal” arrangement and a departure from the agreed federal basis for a solution. Mr Talat’s lack of reference to agreed principles that would guide the peace process and form the basis for a settlement—such as federation, UN resolutions, single sovereignty and international personality for the united Cyprus—raised further questions as to the real intentions of the Turkish side with regard to the solution they would pursue in the negotiations ahead. Similar concerns arose from his subsequent comments advocating a separate “right to self-determination” for the Turkish Cypriot community as part of a settlement.

Such an attitude as well as ongoing hardline statements by Turkey’s leaders, with regard to Cyprus, cast a shadow on the negotiations. They run contrary to the positive, constructive, cooperative, and conciliatory spirit brought to this new effort by the president of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot side, which spirit is required for the success of the peace process.

Meanwhile, in order to emphasise the significance attributed by the UN to the peace negotiations, the UN Secretary-General arrived in Cyprus for a three-day visit on 31 January 2010 to express his personal support for the talks and to encourage the two leaders to bring these talks to a successful conclusion. The Secretary-General pointed out that “this process belongs to Cyprus. The UN is here at the invitation of both sides to assist. Your destiny is in your hands. You have taken responsibility for finding a solution. You are the ones driving the process and the ones who will benefit from tremendous benefits and opportunities a settlement will bring to this island.”

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Following meetings with President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat on 1 February 2010, a statement was read out by the Secretary-General on behalf of the two leaders stressing that they have worked on the basis of the integrated whole approach that is "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed". In the statement, the leaders add: "Good convergence has already been achieved in some Chapters. For the rest, we are determined to work hard to achieve the desired progress. [...] We express our strong commitment to continue to work on this and the rest of the Chapters. We express our confidence that with good will and determination, we can achieve a solution in the shortest possible time."

The last meeting between President Christofias and Mr Talat was held on 30 March 2010. After the meeting a joint statement was issued noting that the two leaders have been encouraged by the important progress made so far on the Chapters of Governance and Power Sharing, EU Matters and the Economy and that they are convinced that with perseverance a comprehensive settlement can be achieved. The talks resumed on 26 May 2010 between President Christofias and Mr Dervish Eroglu, who succeeded Mr Talat in April as leader of the Turkish Cypriot community.

Due to the positions of the new Turkish Cypriot leader regarding the basis of the solution, but also his proposals at the negotiating table, there was a slowdown of the negotiation process.

President Christofias, sensing the need to give a new boost to the process made a three pillar proposal in July 2010. It provided for the return of the fenced city of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants in conjunction with opening the port of Famagusta to international traffic and the conduct of restoration study of the medieval city of Famagusta. This proposal aimed at restoring confidence between the two communities in order to facilitate the climate for reunification. Secondly, the proposal aimed at speeding up the talks by linking the negotiation on the interrelated Chapters of Property, Territorial Adjustment and Asylum and Citizenship (settlers). It also provided for an international conference to deal with the international aspects of the Cyprus problem to be convened when agreement on internal aspects is within reach. Unfortunately, the Turkish side has not yet accepted the proposal.

On 18 November 2010, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met with President Christofias and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Dervish Eroglu, in New York. In a statement after the meeting the UN Secretary-General said that there was a constructive exchange of views on the core issues, including governance and power-sharing, economy,

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EU matters, property, territory and security. He noted that he had invited the leaders to meet with him because the “peace talks on Cyprus were losing momentum and needed a boost if the two sides are to reach a settlement.” He pointed out that only the leaders can give that boost and the United Nations can support them stressing that “the United Nations respects these talks as a Cypriot-led process.” He further noted that “serious differences remain” but, he said, both leaders expressed their commitment to “move more quickly and decisively” toward a settlement. The Secretary-General added: “Specifically, the leaders agreed today to intensify their contacts in the coming weeks in order to establish a practical plan for overcoming the major remaining points of disagreement.”

President Christofias expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the meeting and stated: “We want a solution to the Cyprus problem; we do not want talks for the sake of talks...And we will do whatever is possible in order to break the deadlock.”

On 24 November 2010, the UN Secretary-General submitted his report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus to the UN Security Council. Referring to the on-going talks the Secretary-General said that “the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a bizonal, bicomunal federation” adding that “the methodology adopted for the negotiations, as agreed by the leaders, was based on the principle that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’” and that “the agreed solution will be put to separate simultaneous referenda.”

The Secretary-General also pointed out that “now is the moment to dedicate all efforts to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion” and reiterated: “The United Nations stands ready to maintain its enabling role of a Cypriot-led, Cypriot-owned process.”

The Cyprus Government Spokesman commenting on the Report said:

“It is a positive fact that the basis for the solution of the Cyprus problem is outlined in the Report. A solution of a bizonal, bicomunal federation with political equality as described in the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, providing for a single state with one and single sovereignty, single citizenship and single international personality. Additionally, another positive element is the reference to the UN resolutions on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) and the two joint press releases of the leaders of the two communities, on 23 May and 1 July 2008.

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The framework of the procedure being followed at the negotiations is reaffirmed in the Report. Namely, that the procedure is of Cypriot ownership and guidance and that the aim of the talks is the achievement of a mutually agreed solution, which will be put up for approval by the two communities of Cyprus in simultaneous and separate referenda. This procedure excludes the existence of strict time frames and arbitration. The Report also asserts that the entire methodology of the negotiations is based on the principle that 'nothing is considered agreed until everything is agreed.'

On 26 January 2011, the UN Secretary-General held a new meeting in Geneva with President Christofias and Mr Eroglu. In his remarks to the press after the meeting the Secretary-General said: "Since the New York meeting the two leaders worked to move closer together through a range of bridging proposals, notably in the Chapters of Economy, EU Matters and Governance and Power Sharing." Nevertheless, he noted that "more work needs to be done to reach further convergences on outstanding issues." The Secretary-General announced that "the leaders have discussed the outstanding key issues in a more integrated fashion since a settlement proposal will need to consist of an integrated package across Chapters."

In his report of 4 March 2011 to the UN Security Council on the progress of the talks the UN Secretary-General reaffirmed the basis of the talks. "Since the beginning of full-fledged negotiations in September 2008, the talks have proceeded on the basis of United Nations parameters, relevant Security Council resolutions and joint leaders' statements made on 23 May 2008 and 1 July 2008. I am satisfied that the two leaders are committed to the bases for the negotiations as they have confirmed that the talks will continue on the agreed-upon United Nations basis," he said. He also reaffirmed that the UN "respects the talks as a Cypriot-led and Cypriot-owned process and that it is precisely for this reason that we expect the two sides to assume responsibility for driving the process forward."

The Secretary-General held a third meeting with President Christofias and Mr Eroglu in Geneva on 7 July, 2011. He characterised the meeting, immediately afterwards, as "useful and productive" given his assessment that although "both sides have worked steadily to take the negotiations forward...progress has been far too slow," and "some important areas have remained untouched." He further noted that "some of the difficulties that stand in the way of a comprehensive agreement" have been identified and that the "leaders have agreed to enter into an intensive period of negotiations on the core issues" and "will focus on finding a way through

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the difficult core issues.” He also stated that the two leaders accepted his offer for “an enhanced United Nations involvement,” in the “Cypriot-led and Cypriot-owned” negotiations in a manner that does not prejudice “this central principle.” He added that he “took the opportunity to remind both leaders of the parameters of the agreement we are striving to reach as set out in relevant Security Council Resolutions.” He also expressed the expectation that by October 2011 the two leaders “will be able to report that they have reached convergence on all core issues, and we will meet that month in New York.” That, he added, will take the negotiations “close to their conclusion” and would pave the way for him to work “towards convening a final, international conference.”

The Cyprus Government Spokesman said on 10 July that: “We came out of the Geneva meeting with one objective: the discussion of all core issues of the Cyprus problem so as to achieve convergences. The discussion of all the core issues was something that we have been constantly raising. The Turkish Cypriot side must also give its views on these issues.” He added that President Christofias, “as the negotiator of the Greek Cypriot side, is always proceeding with very specific positions about the solution of the Cyprus problem, positions that are founded upon the agreed basis for a bizonal, bicomunal federation and are always in line with the UN resolutions on Cyprus. We expect the Turkish Cypriot side to act in the same way in order to pave the road towards the resolution of the Cyprus problem.”

In his address to the UN 66th General Assembly on 22 September 2011, President Christofias reaffirmed the agreed basis of the talks that have been going on since 2008. However, he expressed regret that the Turkish Cypriot leader had “retracted from previous agreements of fundamental importance”. The President said that “During these three years of direct negotiations between the leaders of the two communities convergences have been reached on various aspects of the Cyprus problem. We work hard, and lately intensively, in order to reach more convergences on the core issues. It is with regret that I note that – lately in particular – the Turkish Cypriot side is retracting on the negotiating table, including from previously found convergences. This change in the Turkish Cypriot leadership’s stance feeds on recent negative and provocative policy of Turkey in the region”. He went on to underline that “We believe that the only way to move forward and reach a solution as soon as possible is by upholding the commitments that both sides have undertaken before the Secretary-General. Negotiations must be carried out on a clear basis and without backtracking.”



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On 30-31 October 2011, the UN Secretary-General held a two-day meeting with the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities in Long Island, New York. The Secretary-General said on 1 November 2011 that “discussions have been positive, productive and vigorous. This has given me confidence that a comprehensive settlement can be achieved.” However, he noted that “there is still work to be done. Their Excellencies, Mr Christofias and Mr Eroglu, have agreed that further efforts are essential over the next two months to move to the end game of the negotiations.”

In a statement regarding the talks, President Christofias said, on the same date, that “unfortunately, during the meeting it was not possible to make that great leap to allow for a turning point in the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem”. The President added that “it is for this reason that the Secretary General, evaluating the results of the meeting and the intensive phase of negotiations, suggested that we meet again around mid-January. The aim then is to bridge the gap that separates the two sides on the various fundamental aspects of the Cyprus problem, something which is difficult, bearing in mind the differences.” He also stated on 6 November that the meeting highlighted the difficulties encountered at the negotiating table, noting that the statement of the Secretary-General demonstrates that the progress achieved on the major issues discussed in New York, namely the issues of governance, property, territory and citizenship was very limited to nonexistent. “Progress”, he added, “was achieved on the issues of the economy, internal security and the European Union, which were discussed here in Cyprus and not in New York”. While pointing out that “the course of the talks is full of obstacles and difficulties”, President Christofias reiterated that “we will exhaust all possibilities available within the existing agreed process to achieve freedom and the reunification of Cyprus.” The Secretary-General invited the two leaders to meet with him in a similar format in January 2012.

The international community has warmly welcomed the positive, constructive, cooperative, and conciliatory spirit brought to this new peace effort by the President of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot side, which spirit is required for the success of the peace process. It is hoped that as the peace process moves on, the Turkish side will reciprocate this forward looking approach, which can lead to a mutually agreed comprehensive framework for the reunification of Cyprus. It is also hoped that the international community will work constructively to help the people of Cyprus achieve such a settlement and bring permanent peace on the island.

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The government of Cyprus remains committed to a settlement of the Cyprus problem which will allow Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike, to fully enjoy the benefits and advantages of European Union membership. Such a settlement will allow Cyprus to function effectively within the EU, ensure respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots, and provide for a peaceful, prosperous, and secure future. In view of this, the government has worked systematically to create conditions conducive to the new process of direct negotiations to take place between the two communities. These negotiations can lead to a mutually acceptable settlement, within the new political context resulting from the accession of Cyprus to the European Union.

### ***Cyprus and the European Union***

The Republic of Cyprus signed an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972 and applied for membership in the European Communities in 1990. The European Commission issued a positive avis (opinion) in 1993 recognizing the importance of Cyprus' accession for the security and prosperity of the island and for the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

The European Council agreed in 1995 that accession negotiations with Cyprus would commence six months after the conclusion of the EU intergovernmental conference of 1996. At the European Conference in London, on 12 March 1998, the president of Cyprus invited the Turkish Cypriot community to join the Cypriot EU negotiating team, but the Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected the invitation. By December 2002, all chapters in the negotiations with the EU were closed and the harmonization process was completed.

Cyprus signed the Treaty of Accession in Athens on 16 April 2003, became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004, participated in the 2004 elections for the European Parliament, and joined the eurozone on 1 January 2008. Under Protocol 10 annexed to the Treaty of Accession, the application of the *acquis* in the areas of Cyprus occupied by Turkey would be suspended until the Cyprus problem was resolved. The same protocol stated the readiness of the EU "to accommodate the terms of such a settlement in line with the principles on which the EU is founded." Cyprus will assume, for the first time, the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2012 as part of a "triple-shared presidency" or Trio over an eighteen month period. The countries making up the Presidency Trio in the period from 1 July 2011 to 31 December 2012 are in turn Poland, Denmark and Cyprus.

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While the UN Secretary-General's mission of good offices has provided the framework for a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem, the EU is now expected to assume a central role in assuring that any proposed settlement conforms to its principles and legal norms. This is in sharp contrast to the role the EU was relegated to during the presentation of the Secretary-General's plan on Cyprus in 2004.

Turkey's EU accession process also provides new opportunities for addressing some of the thorniest aspects of the Cyprus problem, such as protection of human rights, non-intervention, the sovereignty of the Republic, and the functionality of government institutions.

Unfortunately, Turkey's unilateral declaration on the non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus at the time of the ratification of Turkey's customs union protocol raises serious questions about Turkey's compliance with EU norms and obligations and its intentions in the search for a viable settlement of the Cyprus problem. The EU responded to this unilateral declaration by calling on Turkey to comply with its obligations and has reiterated that position on several occasions to no avail. The months and years ahead will provide a test not only of Turkey's intentions, but also of the EU's ability to uphold fundamental principles while pursuing further enlargement.

Turkey still refuses access to its ports, airports, and air corridors to aircraft and ships from the Republic of Cyprus. This awkward and anomalous situation, where an EU candidate state refuses to recognize one of the EU member states which will be voting on Turkey's accession prospects needs to be rectified.

The EU in December 2006 sanctioned Turkey by imposing a partial freeze on its accession talks for its non-compliance with respect to its obligations toward Cyprus. It was decided to suspend work in eight of 35 policy areas (Chapters) into which accession negotiations are divided. It was also agreed that negotiations on issues not affected by this freeze should not be concluded until Turkey complies with its obligation to open its ports and airports to traffic from Cyprus.

Turkey's negative stance towards the Republic of Cyprus is also reflected in the European Commission's 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 Progress Reports on Turkey, which state that Turkey has made no progress towards fully implementing the Additional Protocol and that it is urgent that Turkey fulfils its obligation.

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Moreover, the 2011 Report points out the following:

“As emphasised by the negotiating framework and Council declarations, Turkey is expected actively to support the negotiations aimed at finding a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded. Turkey’s commitment in concrete terms to a comprehensive settlement is crucial.

Despite repeated calls by the Council and the Commission, Turkey still has not complied with its obligations outlined in the declaration of the European Community and its member states of 21 September 2005 and in the Council conclusions, including the December 2006 and December 2010 conclusions.

It does not meet its obligation to ensure full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and has not removed all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on direct transport links with Cyprus.”

The 2011 Report points out that “there was no progress on normalising bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey has not lifted its veto of Cyprus’s membership of several international organisations, including the OECD and the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods. The Republic of Cyprus reported violations of its territorial waters and airspace by Turkey. Senior representatives of the Turkish government have stated that relations with the EU Presidency will be frozen for six months as of 1 July 2012 in the absence of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue when Cyprus takes over the Council presidency.”

This same position is also reflected in the European Parliament resolution of 10 February 2010 on Turkey’s 2009 Progress Report. The resolution specifically “calls on Turkey to facilitate a suitable climate for negotiations by immediately starting to withdraw its forces from Cyprus, by addressing the issue of the settlement of Turkish citizens on the island and also by enabling the return of the sealed-off section of Famagusta to its lawful inhabitants in compliance with Resolution 550(1984) of the United Nations Security Council.”

Similar positions are also reflected in the European Parliament resolution of 9 March 2011 on Turkey’s 2010 Progress Report, which specifically calls on the government of Turkey “to facilitate a suitable climate for

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negotiations by starting to withdraw its forces from Cyprus immediately; strongly urges the two communities in Cyprus to work intensively, to capitalise on the progress already made in the negotiations, in order to reach a sustainable solution – in line with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and promoting, in particular, Resolution 550 (1984) and with the principles on which the EU is founded...”

In addition, the resolution “encourages Turkey to intensify its support for the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, in particular by facilitating its access to military zones and archives, and to take all other appropriate action, in accordance with the findings of the European Court of Human Rights, on the humanitarian issue of missing persons.”

It also “calls on Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to refrain from any new settlements of Turkish citizens on the island, as this would continue to change its demographic balance and reduce the allegiance of its citizens to a future common state based on its common past; calls on Turkey to address the issue of the settlement of Turkish citizens on the island, in accordance with the Geneva Convention and the principles of the International Law.”

Moreover, the resolution “emphasises that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has been signed by the EU, the 27 member states and all the other candidate countries and that it is part of the *acquis communautaire*; calls, therefore, on the Turkish Government to sign and ratify it without further delay.” This is particularly important in view of Turkey’s provocations and threats against Cyprus since the latter has started, in 2011, exploratory offshore drilling for hydrocarbons in its Exclusive Economic Zone in accordance with international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The exclusive, non-negotiable sovereign right of Cyprus with regard to hydrocarbons exploration in its Exclusive Economic Zone is universally recognised and has been publicly acknowledged and endorsed by the international community including by the EU, the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the United States of America, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece, Egypt, Israel and many others.

The EU has taken a firm position regarding the Cyprus problem that respects the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the country, in accordance with international law, the relevant UN resolutions and the high-level agreements between the two communities and in line with the principles upon which the Union was founded. The support by the EU for the ongoing efforts for a settlement is highly

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significant since the Union is in the position to exert the necessary pressure on Turkey to contribute in concrete terms to a settlement on Cyprus and abandon its intransigent stance.

The government of Cyprus has been disappointed that Turkey's EU accession course, which Cyprus has supported, has not had the catalytic effect on Ankara that it was hoped for with regard to the Cyprus problem. In fact, Turkey not only continues its aggression against Cyprus but also steadfastly refuses to implement obligations it has undertaken toward the EU, obligations that affect directly the interests of Cyprus.

### **Conclusion**

Having successfully joined the EU, the people of Cyprus still yearn for the reunification of their country. The government of Cyprus is determined to continue its search for a viable and functional solution within the parameters of the UN resolutions as well as the new political context created by the accession of Cyprus to the EU, in order to safeguard the rights of all Cypriots. In this manner, all Cypriots will fully enjoy the benefits and advantages of EU membership and bring about the reunification of their country after more than nearly four decades of artificial division.

Initiatives by President Papadopoulos to reactivate the peace process in the aftermath of the failed Annan Plan led to the 8 July 2006 Agreement between the two communities. Regrettably, the Agreement's implementation was undermined by the Turkish side. New initiatives by President Christofias broke the deadlock, moved the process forward, and resulted in the commencement of full-fledged negotiations between the two communities in September 2008, directed toward a comprehensive settlement. His efforts have also reinvigorated the interest of the international community in the Cyprus peace process resulting in broad support for direct negotiations and the search for permanent peace on the island.

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## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

### *From Independence to the Turkish invasion, 1960–1974*

Cyprus was proclaimed an independent, sovereign republic on 16 August 1960. The independence of Cyprus was based on the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements negotiated by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. These agreements included a Constitution and three treaties: the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Establishment. These agreements ended 82 years of British rule following many years of a national liberation movement that included peaceful mass anticolonial protests and demonstrations, recourse to the United Nations for self-determination for the people of the island to decide their own future, and eventually a four-year armed struggle (1955–59).

Active opposition to colonial rule came from the Greek Cypriot community, whose majority at the time aspired to union of Cyprus with Greece. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, on the other hand, prompted by the British, advocated partition of the island with a Turkish Cypriot sector uniting with Turkey. (These diametrically opposed visions were later specifically prohibited by the 1959 agreements that established Cyprus' independence). British rule did not encourage the emergence of a Cypriot national identity. Instead, Britain used the “divide and rule” policy as an instrument to control anticolonial sentiment on the island. It enlisted Turkish Cypriots on its side against the Greek Cypriot liberation movement, thereby planting the seeds of intercommunal discord and polarization between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, a development that was to prove detrimental to their cooperation upon independence.

Although they eventually signed the Zurich and London agreements, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities had no serious role in their drafting or in the drafting of the Constitution for the new republic. In fact, the very people who would be affected the most by these elaborate documents were never given the opportunity to vote on them. In effect, both the agreements and the constitution of the nascent republic were imposed on the people of Cyprus. As a result, the fate of the new republic was jeopardized in vitro.

Certain provisions of the agreements and the constitution, rather than promoting peace through intercommunal solidarity and loyalty to a common state as well as respect for the sovereignty of the new republic, proved conducive to domestic conflict and foreign interference. It soon

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became clear that Cyprus was granted a fettered independence and dysfunctional constitutional arrangements. The constitution itself emphasized differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, thereby thwarting integrative tendencies and encouraging divisive behavior between the two communities.

The agreements provided for complex power sharing arrangements between the two communities (the Greek Cypriot numerical majority community of 82 percent of the population and the Turkish Cypriot numerical minority community of 18 percent of the population) and granted extraordinary veto powers to the Turkish Cypriot community. The three guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) were given vaguely defined rights to interfere in Cypriot affairs under certain conditions. In addition, the United Kingdom retained "sovereign base areas" that amount to 2.7 percent of the territory of the island as well as important intelligence gathering facilities, while Greece and Turkey were to station small military contingents (numbering 950 and 650 troops respectively) on the island.

The divisive nature of the constitution and the rigidity of its principal articles made the operation of a democratic government difficult and caused increasing acrimony between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The constitution soon proved unworkable. By 1963, a series of deadlocks over state budgets, taxation, municipalities, and other issues led to a constitutional crisis that threatened to paralyze the operation of the government and the state.\* The president of the Republic felt compelled to propose on 30 November certain constitutional modifications for discussion, which were intended to "remove obstacles to the smooth functioning and development of the state." The government of Turkey, however, outright rejected the suggested constitutional amendments. The Turkish Cypriot leadership followed suit and subsequently fell in line with Turkey's long-term policy to partition the island.

The Vice-President of the Republic, who was a Turkish Cypriot, declared on 30 December 1963 that the Cypriot constitution was dead and there was no possibility of Greek and Turkish Cypriots living and working together. "Call it partition if you like," he told the foreign media. The atmosphere on Cyprus became tense and volatile. Relations between the two communities deteriorated as a series of events snowballed into a crisis extending beyond the borders of Cyprus. Isolated minor incidents escalated into intercommunal clashes. Turkish Cypriots from around the

\* See Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968).



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island, under pressure from their leadership, started concentrating into certain areas, in line with Turkey's policy to form Turkish enclaves under its control in order to separate the two communities as a first step toward the partition of Cyprus along ethnic lines. The Turkish Cypriot Ministers withdrew from the government, the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives withdrew from the parliament, and Turkish Cypriot civil servants ceased to attend their jobs. Eventually, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from all state institutions and government agencies. There were flare-ups of intercommunal violence in 1963–64 and again in 1967. Turkey threatened to intervene militarily in Cyprus but international pressure prevented a military invasion in 1964 and 1967.

Following the threats by Turkey against Cyprus, the government of the Republic brought the matter to the UN Security Council. The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, whose basic principles have guided international actions on Cyprus ever since. This resolution:

- Established the UN Secretary-General's mission of good offices aiming at a peaceful solution on the basis of an agreed settlement in accordance with the UN Charter
- Created UNFICYP, the UN peacekeeping force on Cyprus
- Reaffirmed the sovereignty and continuing existence of the Republic of Cyprus
- Reaffirmed the continuity of the government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Despite calls by the Security Council to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to abstain from the threat or use of force against it, Turkey's air force bombed Cypriot villages in August 1964.

On 26 March 1965, UN mediator Dr Galo Plaza issued one of the most significant reports ever to be prepared on Cyprus (S/6253). The Plaza report considered the 1959 arrangement as "a constitutional oddity;" questioned the functionality of federalism demanded by the Turkish side due to the hardship and inhumane nature inherent in population movements; was critical of disproportionate minority vetoes; and perceived the protection of the rights of minorities to be in international instruments such as the European Convention. Arguing strongly against the geographical separation of the two communities advocated by the Turkish side, Dr Plaza stated that:

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if the purpose of a settlement of the Cyprus question is to be the preservation rather than the destruction of the state and if it is to foster rather than to militate against the development of a peacefully united people, I cannot help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from the majority should not be considered a desperate step in the wrong direction.

Turkey instantly rejected the report and its recommendations and declared that it would not deal with the UN mediator. UN mediation came to an end, and thereafter the UN involvement in the Cyprus peace process has been conducted under the Secretary-General's good offices.

The UN Secretary-General in his Report S/6426, of 10 June 1965, described the policy of the Turkish side at the time as follows:

The Turkish Cypriot leaders have adhered to a rigid stand against any measures which might involve having members of the two communities live and work together, or which might place Turkish Cypriots in situations where they would have to acknowledge the authority of the Government agents. Indeed, since the Turkish Cypriot leadership is committed to physical and geographical separation of the communities as a political goal, it is not likely to encourage activities by Turkish Cypriots which may be interpreted as demonstrating the merits of an alternative policy. The result has been a seemingly deliberate policy of self-segregation by the Turkish Cypriots.

The government of Cyprus took various measures to restore normalcy on the island. These steps resulted in the elimination of intercommunal violence and dramatic reduction of tensions between the two communities. The government also offered economic incentives to Turkish Cypriots, who had been forced by their leaders to move to Turkish controlled enclaves, to return to their homes. The Turkish side did not reciprocate, maintaining, instead, roadblocks in order to keep Greek Cypriots from Turkish enclaves.

In 1968, the government initiated talks with the Turkish Cypriot leadership under UN auspices for a negotiated agreement on a more functional constitutional system for the Republic of Cyprus. These talks had achieved considerable progress and, according to some reports, were close to success, when they were interrupted by the tragic events of 1974.

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## *The 1974 Turkish Invasion and its Consequences\**

In 1967, a military junta seized power in Greece. The relationship between that regime and President Makarios of Cyprus was tense from the outset and became increasingly strained. President Makarios made it known that he was convinced that the Athens junta was involved in efforts to undermine his authority and policies through extremist underground organizations in Cyprus conspiring against his government and against his life.

On 15 July 1974, the Greek military junta and its Greek Cypriot collaborators carried out a coup against the democratically elected president of Cyprus. Using this criminal act as a pretext, Turkey invaded Cyprus five days later. In a two-phase invasion in July and August, and despite calls by the UN Security Council [Resolution 353 (1974)] and the quick restoration of constitutional order on the island, Turkey occupied 36,2 percent of the sovereign territory of the Republic\*\* and forcibly expelled about 180.000 Greek Cypriots from their homes. Another 20.000 Greek Cypriots, who remained in the occupied areas, were also forced to eventually abandon their homes and seek refuge in the safety of the government controlled areas. Today, fewer than 500 enclaved Greek Cypriots remain in the occupied areas (See Appendix 3).

Turkey still deprives the displaced Greek Cypriots of their right to return to their homes and properties. This has given rise to appeals to the European Court of Human Rights, which has issued major decisions on Turkey's violations of the European Convention (See Appendix 2).

In addition to the economic devastation caused by the invasion and the forcible population movement, over 3.000 persons were killed, while some 1.400 Greek Cypriots remain missing.

Turkey's occupation brought economic ruin to the part of the island which prior to 1974 was the richest and most developed. Poor economic conditions resulting from Turkey's mismanagement and Turkey's systematic colonization of the occupied areas by illegal settlers forced Turkish Cypriots to emigrate to Europe and elsewhere. The settlers currently outnumber the indigenous Turkish Cypriots by about two to one. Independent observers have documented this issue for the Parliamentary

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\* See Appendix 3.

\*\* About the same size depicted on maps of a partitioned Cyprus circulated by the Turkish side in the 1950s. See maps on page 43.

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Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1992 and again in 2003. Finally, there are still over 43.000 heavily armed troops from Turkey in the occupied areas. It should be noted that beginning with Security Council Resolution 353 of 20 July 1974, the UN has called for “an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus,” and for “the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements.”

In violation of international law and UN resolutions, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot regime have systematically attempted to eradicate the Greek cultural heritage in the occupied areas. Towns and villages have been given Turkish names, while archaeological sites, churches and cemeteries have been plundered, damaged or converted to other uses.

In November 1983, Turkey instigated and endorsed a “unilateral declaration of independence” in the occupied area by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The so-called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) has not been recognized by anyone other than Turkey, which exercises virtual control over it. UN Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) categorically condemned this unilateral action, declared it invalid, called for its withdrawal, and called on all UN member-states not to recognize this illegal entity. The EU and other international and regional organizations have adopted similar positions. For all legal and political purposes, the international community recognizes only the Republic of Cyprus created in 1960 and its government, even though the government cannot currently exercise its authority in areas under military occupation by Turkey.

Legal decisions by regional and national courts in Western Europe, in the United States, and in the United Kingdom provide an important independent record of the consequences of Turkey’s 1974 invasion and its continuing occupation of Cyprus. They also affirm the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus and of its government. These decisions constitute an important foundation for any future comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem (See Appendix 2).

# MAPS



*“The European Union can and should play a role in the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. We look forward to the solidarity of our European partners and we expect that they will contribute toward breaking the deadlock and solving the Cyprus problem.*

...

*As a member of the European Union, the Republic of Cyprus will participate actively in developments in Europe, with the goal of realising the vision of a socially sensitive Europe. Cyprus can become a bridge between Europe and the countries in our region and also with countries with which our island maintains relations within the ranks of the non-aligned movement.”*


[President Demetris Christofias, Inaugural Speech, 28 February 2008]

*“...it should always be kept in mind that Cyprus is a full member state of the European Union, and that the solution must respect and implement the principles on which the European Union is founded.”*

[President Demetris Christofias, Opening Statement at the launch of the direct negotiations with the Turkish Cypriot leader on the Cyprus Problem, 3 September 2008]



Map showing the 1974 UN ceasefire line across the Republic of Cyprus and the areas of the Republic under military occupation by Turkey.



*Partition of Cyprus as suggested in 1957 by Turkish Cypriot leader, Dr Fazil Kuchuk, in his pamphlet "The Cyprus Question: A Permanent Solution," along the line shown on the map. The proposed "Turkish part" is the shaded area in the north of the island.*



*The dividing line as established by Turkey's invading army in 1974. The shaded area in the north is still under military occupation by Turkey.*





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## APPENDICES

### *1. Policy Initiatives for Turkish Cypriots*

While actively searching for a solution to the Cyprus problem, the government introduced, as of 30 April 2003, a series of policy initiatives in order to provide Turkish Cypriots, who reside mainly in the occupied areas, the opportunity to enjoy, to the extent possible under the current circumstances, the rights and benefits the Cyprus Republic offers to its citizens. The implementation of these initiatives and confidence-building measures takes place within the context of the laws of the Republic of Cyprus, international law, and the EU *acquis communautaire*.

The government initiatives concern, among others:

- Movement of goods, persons and vehicles
- Employment of Turkish Cypriots in the government-controlled areas
- Professional training of Turkish Cypriots and their participation in international athletic and other events abroad
- Issuing of official certificates and other documents such as passports and identity cards of the Republic to Turkish Cypriots
- Protection of the cultural heritage of Turkish Cypriots
- Clearing of the minefields inside the buffer zone along the UN ceasefire line; and
- Assistance to the relatives of the Turkish Cypriot missing persons and non-combatants killed during the 1963–67 period and in 1974.

The government pays social insurance pensions, grants, allowances and other benefits to qualified Turkish Cypriots and provides free medical treatment to thousands of Turkish Cypriots each year. Turkish Cypriots working in the government-controlled areas receive hundreds of thousands of euro in income, while Greek Cypriots crossing into the occupied territories spend million of euro there. Finally, for decades, the Cyprus Electricity Authority had also provided free electricity to the Turkish Cypriot community in the occupied areas. For the period 1974–2006 alone, nearly 300 million euro worth of electricity was supplied to Turkish Cypriots. Water was also supplied to them for free.

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The increase in the economic activity across the ceasefire line since 2003 has been a major factor in the rise of the per capita income of the Turkish Cypriots that has more than doubled in the last few years. In addition, up until November 2011, over 101.000 Turkish Cypriots have acquired official Republic of Cyprus birth certificates; over 93.000 have acquired identity cards; and over 63.000 have acquired passports.

To help promote reunification and reconciliation, the government, despite the obstacles put forward by the Turkish side, has consistently pursued policies for improving the economic situation of the Turkish Cypriots. It is in this spirit that it consented to the EU Regulation on Financial Assistance of two hundred and fifty nine million euro to benefit the Turkish Cypriot community. To facilitate the allocation of aid to Turkish Cypriots, the government, in March 2008, withdrew its appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for the annulment of bids submitted in relation to provisions of the EU Regulation, after the European Commission amended the relevant misleading text.

In July 2004, the government also proposed additional measures including the extension of the clearing of minefields in the buffer zone in cooperation with the UN. Although the Turkish side has not yet fulfilled all its obligations in this regard, the government, in its efforts to ease tensions and create a better political climate, proceeded unilaterally with the clearing of its minefields inside the buffer zone. With the destruction of the last antipersonnel mine on 10 July 2007, Cyprus fully met its obligations under the Ottawa Convention.

In addition, the government offered to provide special arrangements for Turkish Cypriots to use the port of Larnaka for the export of their products. It has further proposed the lawful operation (by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots) of the Famagusta port under the supervision of the EU, provided that the area of Varosha is returned to its Greek Cypriot legal inhabitants under the control of the government of Cyprus.

The government's overall constructive approach toward the Turkish Cypriots, both unilaterally and through the EU, is designed to foster cooperation and trust between the two communities. The government will continue to promote reconciliation and reintegration through tangible means, thereby paving the way for a comprehensive and viable solution to the Cyprus problem.

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## **2. Important Legal Decisions on the Cyprus Question\***

- **Cyprus v. Turkey (6780/74) and (6950/75)–European Commission of Human Rights, 1976**

In a joint report (1976) under former article 31 of the European Convention, Turkey was found to have violated articles 2 (right to life), 5 (liberty and security of the person), 8 (respect for private and family life, home, etc), 13 (effective remedies for violations of rights and freedoms), and article 1 of Protocol 1 (peaceful enjoyment of possessions). On 20 January 1979, the Committee of Ministers adopted resolution DH (79) calling for the enduring protection of human rights through intercommunal talks leading to a solution of the dispute.

- **Cyprus v. Turkey (8007/77)–European Commission of Human Rights, 1983**

The Commission, under former article 31 of the European Convention, found Turkey in breach of its obligations under article 5 (liberty and security of the person), article 8 (respect for private and family life, home, etc) and article 1 of Protocol 1 (peaceful enjoyment of possessions). On 2 April 1992 the Committee of Ministers adopted resolution DH (92)12 in respect to the Commission's Report and made the 1983 report public.

- **Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts Inc., 917 F.2d 278, US Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, Decision of 24 October 1990**

By its decision, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of 3 August 1989 of the US District Court in Indianapolis. The case involved the ownership of plundered sixth-century mosaics from the Church of Kanakaria in the occupied part of Cyprus. The mosaics had been removed by Turkish antiquities smugglers and sold to an American art dealer for \$1.2 million. The mosaics were returned to their legitimate owner, the Church of Cyprus. This decision set an important precedent in the US for the protection of cultural property. Even though it has ratified the 1954 and 1970 UNESCO conventions on the protection of cultural property, Turkey has done little to stop the vandalism, destruction and plunder of Greek Cypriot cultural property in areas controlled by the Turkish army.

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\* See Van Coufoudakis, *Human Rights Violations in Cyprus by Turkey*, Third Edition, (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 2009).

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- **Court of Justice of the European Communities–Case C-439/92, 5 July 1994**

The Court ruled that only import and phytosanitary certificates issued by the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus could be accepted by the European Community member-states. The ruling acknowledged that the only Cypriot state recognized by the European Community is the Republic of Cyprus. Import and phytosanitary certificates issued by Turkish Cypriot “authorities” are excluded because the “entity such as that established in the northern part of Cyprus...is recognized neither by the Community nor by the member-states.”

The Court of Justice looked into the matter at the request of Britain’s High Court following a case filed in the United Kingdom by Cypriot exporters of citrus fruit and potatoes. The High Court requested an interpretation of relevant provisions of the EC-Cyprus Association Agreement of 1972 and of the EC Council Directive 77/93/EEC. Britain’s High Court affirmed the Court of Justice decision in November 1994. This important decision recognized the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus over the whole of the island with regard to its relations with the European Community.

- **Loizidou v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, 18 December 1996 and 28 July 1998**

The European Court of Human Rights found that the applicant, Ms Titina Loizidou, a citizen of the Republic of Cyprus, remained the legal owner of her property that was located in the areas occupied by the Turkish army. The Court made three judgments: on preliminary objections (23 March 1995); on the merits of the case (18 December 1996); and on “just satisfaction” (28 July 1998). In a precedent-setting decision, the Court regarded Turkey as an occupying power responsible for the policies and actions of the authorities in the occupied areas. The Turkish Cypriot “authorities” were described as Turkey’s “subordinate local administration.”

Turkey was found in breach of article 1, Protocol 1 of the Convention by its continuous denial to the plaintiff of access to her property and by its purported expropriation without compensation. On 28 July 1998 the Court ordered Turkey to pay damages to Ms Loizidou. Turkey’s refusal to comply with the judgment resulted in resolutions by the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe. These resolutions deplored Turkey’s non-compliance, reminded Turkey of its acceptance of the Convention and of the Court’s

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compulsory jurisdiction, and called on the Council to take appropriate steps to enforce compliance. With decisions pending on Turkey's EU application and under the threat of sanctions, Turkey, in December 2003, did pay the sum of 641.000 Cyprus pounds (approximately \$1.5 million), to Titina Loizidou. However, Turkey has not taken any steps leading to the restitution of Ms Loizidou's property.

- **Cyprus v. Turkey, Application No. 25781/94 European Court of Human Rights, 10 May 2001**

This is the most far reaching decision on the applications filed by the government of the Republic of Cyprus against Turkey. The decision affirmed the earlier interstate applications by Cyprus under former article 31 of the Convention (10 July 1976 and 4 October 1983). The earlier cases had documented various violations of the Convention by Turkey since the 1974 invasion.

By majority votes this decision determined:

- That Turkey was in continuing violation of articles 2, 3, and 5 of the Convention by its failure to conduct effective investigations into the whereabouts and the fate of Greek Cypriot missing persons.
- That by its refusal to allow any Greek Cypriot displaced persons to return to their homes, Turkey was in continuing violation of article 8 of the Convention. Similar continuing violations were found on article 1, Protocol 1 (denial of access, control, use, enjoyment of property rights); and article 13 (absence of effective remedies for the property rights of displaced Greek Cypriots).
- Turkey violated the rights of Greek Cypriots living in “northern” Cyprus; this includes violations of article 9 (respectful treatment); article 10 (censorship of school books); article 1, Protocol 1 (right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions); article 2 (no appropriate secondary school facilities); article 3 (discrimination amounting to degrading treatment); article 13 (absence of remedies).
- Violation of Turkish Cypriot rights in the occupied areas under article 6 (trial of civilians by military courts).

In addressing the case, the Court also affirmed the *Loizidou v. Turkey* case (1996 and 1998); the illegality of the proclamation of the so-called “TRNC” in 1983 and its “constitution” (1985); and the earlier decisions on the

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interstate applications filed by the Republic of Cyprus (6780/74, 6950/75 and 8007/77). The Court held Turkey responsible for all these violations as it had “effective overall control of northern Cyprus.” The Court also affirmed that the government of the Republic was the sole legitimate government on the island.

- **The case of Varnava and Others v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, 10 January 2008**

On 10 January 2008, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) delivered its judgment in the case of Varnava and Others v Turkey (Applications nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90) by which Turkey was found guilty of violating the rights of nine Greek-Cypriot missing persons and their relatives. The nine were combatants, except for Savvas Hadjipanteli whose remains have been identified. They were all seen alive after their capture by the Turkish army in Cyprus and also in Turkey where they had been transported as prisoners of war.

The seven-judge panel of the ECHR’s Third Section, with only the judge from Turkey dissenting, held Turkey responsible for the violation of the following articles 2,3 and 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In its decision, the ECHR stressed that Turkey was obliged under international treaties to respect the wounded, prisoners of war, and civilians; specifically under the European Convention of Human Rights, it was obliged to take reasonable steps to protect the lives of those not, or no longer, engaged in hostilities. The judgment also rejects outright the Turkish position that the persons who disappeared during the 1974 Turkish invasion, and are still missing, should be presumed dead. Regarding the relatives of those who disappeared while under Turkey’s custody, the ECHR observes that they “must have undoubtedly suffered most painful uncertainty and anxiety and furthermore their mental anguish did not vanish with the passing of time.”

- **Apostolides v Orams (Case No: A2/2006/2114), British Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 19 January 2010**

The British Court of Appeal ruled that a decision by a Cypriot Court, in connection with claims relating to Greek Cypriot owned property in the areas of Cyprus occupied by Turkey, must be executed.

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The decision came after an appeal by the Orams couple to the British Court of Appeal on a decision by a Cypriot court ordering the Orams to pay compensation to Apostolides, demolish the holiday home they had built on his property in the village of Lapithos occupied by Turkey, halt all intervention on the said property and deliver it to its legal owner. Meletis Apostolides had taken the Orams couple to court, claiming his property rights over his property in the occupied area where the Orams had built, illegally, a holiday home.

- **European Court of Human Rights Decision on the Application of “Demopoulos v Turkey and 7 Others,” 5 March 2010**

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) delivered its decision on the case of “Demopoulos v Turkey and 7 Others” that the so-called immovable property commission (IPC), which was set up in the areas of Cyprus occupied by Turkey, constitutes an effective domestic remedy. The decision clarifies that the IPC constitutes a domestic remedy of the government of Turkey and not of the illegal regime in occupied Cyprus,

According to the Court’s decision, Greek Cypriots will first have to resort to the IPC before resorting to the ECHR.

The Government Spokesman stated that the judgment will be respected but that it is a negative development, pointing out that the Court cannot refer property owners to means which are essentially the product of illegality, if they want to seek restitution of their right to their property that is under military occupation by Turkey.

### **3. Consequences of the Turkish Invasion and Occupation: Facts and Figures**

- Over one third (36,2 percent) of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cyprus remains occupied by Turkey.
- About 200.000 Greek Cypriots, about one third of the total population at the time, were forcibly expelled from the occupied northern part of the island where they constituted about 70 percent of the population; they are still deprived of the right to return to their homes and properties. The Turkish Cypriots living in the free areas were forced by their leadership to move to the occupied areas.
- Some 1.400 persons (among them several hundred civilians) are still missing, but the Turkish side refuses to fully co-operate in ascertaining their fate.
- Less than 500 Greek and Maronite Cypriots enclaved in their villages in the occupied areas are still living under oppression, deprivation and intimidation. (At the end of 1974 there were 20.000 enclaved, most of whom were subsequently forced by the illegal regime to abandon their homes and became refugees).
- A force of more than 43.000 Turkish troops, supported by the Turkish air force and navy, are still in the occupied areas of Cyprus.
- More than 160.000 settlers from Turkey have illegally colonized the occupied areas, as part of Turkey's policy to alter the demographic structure of the island.
- More than 57.000 out of 116.000 Turkish Cypriots have emigrated since the invasion, according to Turkish Cypriot sources, because of the economic, social and moral situation prevailing in the occupied areas.
- There has been systematic usurpation, misappropriation and exploitation of properties belonging to Greek Cypriots who were forcibly displaced by the Turkish invasion in 1974.
- Turkey and the illegal occupation regime have systematically eradicated the cultural and historical heritage of 11.000 years in the occupied areas. Some examples:
  - Illegal excavations and smuggling of antiquities are openly taking place all the time with the involvement or, at least, acquiescence of the occupying forces;



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- Innumerable icons, religious artifacts and archaeological treasures have been stolen and smuggled abroad;
  - The cemeteries of at least 25 villages have been desecrated and destroyed;
  - Hundreds of churches and monasteries have been plundered. Of these:
    - 125 churches have been turned into mosques, an old Ottoman tradition, in occupied territories;
    - 67 have been turned into stables or hay warehouses;
    - 57 have become museums, cultural centers or hotels;
    - 17 have become hostels, restaurants or military warehouses;
    - 25 have been demolished;
    - 229 have been totally desecrated.



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## CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS

**The history of Cyprus dates to the 9th millennium B.C.**

<b>2nd and 1st millennium B.C.</b>	Mycenean and Achean Greeks settle in Cyprus bringing Greek civilization to the island.
<b>30 B.C.–330 A.D.</b>	Cyprus a province of the Roman Empire.
<b>330–1191</b>	Cyprus a province of the Byzantine Empire.
<b>1191–1571</b>	Cyprus under the rule of the Crusaders, the Order of the Knights Templar, the French Lusignans (1192–1489), and the Venetians (1489–1571).
<b>1571–1878</b>	Cyprus under Ottoman rule.
<b>1878</b>	Cyprus leased by the Ottoman Empire to Britain.
<b>1914</b>	Cyprus annexed by Britain following Turkey's alignment with Germany in WWI.
<b>1923</b>	Under the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey relinquishes all rights to Cyprus.
<b>1925</b>	Cyprus declared a British crown colony.
<b>1931</b>	First Greek Cypriot uprising against British rule.
<b>1950</b>	Makarios III elected Archbishop of Cyprus.
<b>1954</b>	Greece brings the issue of self-determination for Cyprus to the UN General Assembly.
<b>1955–1959</b>	Greek Cypriot armed anti-colonial struggle.
<b>1959</b>	Cyprus granted independence under agreements negotiated in Zurich and London by Greece, Turkey and Great Britain.
<b>1960 - 16 August</b>	Proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus.
<b>1963 - 30 November</b>	President Makarios submits constitutional amendments to "remove obstacles to the smooth functioning and development of the state," which are rejected by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

<b>1964 - 4 March</b>	UN Security Council adopts resolution 186 whose basic provisions have guided international actions on Cyprus ever since (good offices mission of the UN Secretary General; creation of the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus; reaffirmation of the independence, sovereignty and existence of the Republic of Cyprus and the Cyprus government).
<b>1964 - March–May</b>	Arrival of UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) in Cyprus.
<b>1964 - August</b>	Turkey launches air attacks on Cyprus while U.S. president warns Ankara against invading the island.
<b>1965 - 26 March</b>	UN Mediator Galo Plaza, in report to the Security Council, rejects Turkish position for geographical separation of Cypriot communities.
<b>1967</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Military junta takes over in Greece.</li> <li>- Intercommunal clashes break out in Cyprus, and Turkey prepares to invade the island; crisis diffused after United States mediation.</li> </ul>
<b>1968</b>	Start of UN-sponsored talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
<b>1972</b>	Cyprus-EEC Association Agreement.
<b>1974 - 15 July</b>	Coup against the government of Cyprus organized by the military junta of Greece.
<b>1974 - 20 July</b>	Turkey launches first stage of invasion of Cyprus with massive sea and air military forces.
<b>1974 - 20 July</b>	UN Security Council adopts resolution 353 that “demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus.”
<b>1974 - 23 July</b>	Coup regime collapses and constitutional order is restored in Cyprus.
<b>1974 - 14 August</b>	Turkey launches second stage of military invasion of Cyprus and occupies 36,2 percent of its territory.

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- 1974 - 1 November** Unanimous UN General Assembly Resolution 3212 (including the vote of Turkey) calls for withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus, respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic, cessation of interference in its internal affairs, and return of refugees to their homes under conditions of safety.
- 1977 - 12 February** Four-point agreement on a Cyprus settlement reached between President Makarios and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash.
- 1977 - 3 August** Death of President Makarios, who is succeeded by Spyros Kyprianou.
- 1979 - 19 May** Ten-point agreement on a Cyprus settlement reached between President Kyprianou and Mr Denktash.
- 1983 - 15 November** “Unilateral Declaration of Independence” by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to establish the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” in areas of Cyprus under military occupation by Turkey.
- 1983 - 18 November** UN Security Council condemns the “UDI” declaration, calls it “legally invalid,” calls for its withdrawal, and calls upon all states not to recognise it and to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus (Resolution 541/83).
- 1987** Cyprus-EC Customs Union Protocol.
- 1990 - 4 July** Cyprus applies for membership in the EEC.
- 1992 - 2 April** Council of Europe releases the 4 October 1983 report of European Commission of Human Rights condemning Turkey for massive human rights violations in Cyprus.
- 1992 - 27 April** Council of Europe Rapporteur Alfons Cuco’s report on the demographic structure of the Cypriot communities verifies the extensive colonisation of the occupied area by illegal settlers from Turkey.

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- 1996 - 18 December** The European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe—following an application against Turkey, lodged by a Greek Cypriot, Titina Loizidou, for violating her right of access to her property in the Turkish occupied town of Kyrenia—rules that Turkey is accountable for the violation of human rights in the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus.
- 1998 - 31 March** Accession negotiations start between Cyprus and EU.
- 1999 - 11 December** The Helsinki European Council Presidency conclusions stress that the prior solution to the Cyprus problem is not a precondition for Cyprus' accession to the EU.
- 2001 - 10 May** European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe finds Turkey guilty of gross human rights violations in the areas of the Republic it has been occupying since 1974.
- 2002 - 11 November** UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan submits plan for comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.
- 2002 - 13 December** The European Council decides in Copenhagen to admit Cyprus as a member of the European Union on 1 May 2004.
- 2003 - 16 April** Cyprus signs the EU Treaty of Accession in Athens.
- 2003 - 23 April** Turkish occupation regime announces partial lifting of restrictions it imposed since 1974 on the movement of persons across the UN ceasefire line.
- 2004 - 24 April** Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities vote on Annan Plan V: 75.83 percent of Greek Cypriots vote “No” to the plan while 24.17 percent vote “Yes”; 64.91 percent of Turkish Cypriots vote in favour of the plan while 35.09 percent vote against; Annan Plan fails and is rendered null and void.
- 2004 - 1 May** Cyprus formally accedes to the European Union.

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- 2006 - 8 July** The president of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, agree on a set of principles (The 8 July Agreement) to guide the peace process on Cyprus.
- 2008 - 1 January** Cyprus adopts euro as official currency.
- 2008 - 28 February** In his inaugural speech new president of Cyprus Demetris Christofias pledges to take major initiatives to revive stalled peace process.
- 2008 - 3 September** The president of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, launch direct negotiations on the Cyprus problem.
- 2009 - 28 April** Court of Justice of the European Communities rules that a judgment of a Court in the Republic of Cyprus must be recognized and enforced by the other EU member-states even if it concerns land situated in the Turkish occupied areas of Cyprus.
- 2010 - 31 January** UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon arrives in Cyprus for a three-day visit to express support to the talks.
- 2010 - 10 February** European Parliament adopts resolution on Turkey's Progress Report 2009 calling, among other things, on Turkey to facilitate a suitable climate for negotiations by immediately starting to withdraw its forces from Cyprus.
- 2010 - 5 March** European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decides that the so-called immovable property commission (IPC), which was set up in the areas of Cyprus occupied by Turkey, constitutes an effective domestic remedy of the government of Turkey and not of the illegal regime in occupied Cyprus.
- 2010 - 26 May** Direct intercommunal talks resume between President Christofias and Mr Dervish Eroglu, who succeeded Mr Talat as leader of the Turkish Cypriot community in April.
- 2010 - 1 October** The Republic of Cyprus celebrates its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary.





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